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Abstract 
The purpose of this paper is twofold. The first purpose is to 
contribute in understanding the rationale for intervention in iron 
and steel industry in Japan after World War II. The infant industry 
argument is explained and all criteria for protection discussed. 
The second purpose is to analyze and evaluate protection policy 
in the Japanese iron and steel industry in the period from 1950 to 
1970. In order to evaluate protection policy a partial equilibrium 
approach is used to calculate the country’s welfare effects from 
trade barriers. The results show that the domestic consumers had 
suffered the loss for first ten years, but in the next ten years they 
gained more than four times from protection.
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I. INTRODUCTION
 In the literature of development economics a lot of attention 
was paid to the growth of Japan after World War II. Considering that 
Japan had lost all its empire and
 25 percent of its wealth, the achievement in the rapid 
development was noticed and had to be explained. The existence of 
a favorable external environment such as the growth of world trade, 
the availability of foreign technologies, the Korean War and the 
payments by the USA for Japanese defense, may have played a great 
role in Japanese economic development, but researches on this subject 
“agreed that Japan’s rapid economic growth was not made possible by 
macroeconomic policy alone” (Sazanami 1994, pp.116). Economists 
were and still are interested in the model of Japanese  development 
in  order  to  draw  lessons  which  might  be  useful  in  the economic 
development of other countries.
 There are a wide range of different views regarding the efficacy 
of Japanese industrial policy in promoting the competitiveness of 
specific industries. There are different kinds of approaches evaluating 
the industrial policy of Japan. Many studies on this subject utilize an 
institutional approach (Itoh 1994, Komiya 1990, Krenin
1991, Sakurai 2000). They explain what kinds of institutions are 
needed for effective formulation  of  the  industrial  policy  and  what 
results  are  achieved.  A  second approach, which will be used in this 
paper, focuses on the evaluation of the industrial policy in the specific 
industry. I will take the iron and steel industry as an example.
 H. Muller and K. Kawahito (1978) compared amounts and 
types of investments in major iron and steel producers countries 
and find out that Japanese iron and steel industry was able to make 
large gains in productivity because of the protection. However, 
Japanese steel industry did not gain comparative advantage merely 
by enlarging the size of factory unit. Technological innovation helped 
Japanese iron and steel industries to achieve economies of scale and 
cost competitiveness (Yonekura 1991, Odagiri at. al 1996). Krugman 
(1987) criticized that Japanese industrial policy applied to the iron 
and steel industry after the war was not efficient. However, Komiya 
(1990) compared Krugman’s data with Crandall’s data (1981) of the 
USA and found out that the iron and steel industry in Japan has 
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achieved better results than the iron and steel industry in the USA.
 It is still needed to explain if the protection of iron and steel 
industry in post- war Japan was justified. The purpose of this paper is 
to do that. The aim of this paper is twofold. The first is to contribute 
in understanding the rationale for protection of the iron and steel 
industry. The second is to analyze and evaluate protection policy in 
this industry in the period from 1950 to 1970.
 The paper is organized as follows: next section consists of the 
explanation of the infant industry argument. The third section gives the 
evaluation of the protection policies in the sense of national economic 
welfare. The last section presents the conclusion.
II. THE INFANT INDUSTRY ARGUMENT
 The infant industry argument is the oldest and the best 
known rationale for intervention of an industry. It has offered not just 
justification for industrial policy but make strong case for necessity 
of government intervention while the industry is in the infancy stage. 
The analysis of this argument can be based on two versions: economies 
of scale (static concept) and economies of time (dynamic concept). 
The first version claims that young industries will achieve economies 
of scale when protection gives them preferential access to the domestic 
market. Economies of scale result in falling costs as the scale of output 
at any point in time increases. The second version claims that young 
industries will achieve economies of experience when protection gives 
them a time for learning by doing. Economies of time result in falling 
costs as the length of time.
 As Japan made its postwar industrialization process under the 
protection and this argument provides basic framework for analyzing 
Japanese industrial policy applied in iron and steel industry in the 
1950s.Vestal (1993) was first who noticed the need for defining if 
the iron and steel industry was an infant industry. This question is 
crucial because if it was not an infant industry than it did not required 
government support. Every textbook of the industrial organization 
explains that industry goes through three phases: infancy, maturity 
and declination over the time. An infant industry, by definition, is 
an industry that currently cannot survive in free trade conditions 
without protection, but will acquire a competitive edge against 
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foreign competitors by accumulating production experience and/or 
employing economies of scale if it is temporarily protected during the 
initial stage of development.
 If we consider duration of the industry’s existence, than 
the Japanese iron and steel industry was not in the infancy stage, 
because the industry has been operating since Meiji Era. In addition, 
in pre-war period Japanese iron and steel industry “accumulated 
both technological and organizational skills at quite high level when 
compared with world standards” (Yonekura 1991, pp.203). Odagiri 
and Goto (1996) were eager to outline that production technology 
in the iron and steel industry was at high level before the War. This 
means the industry had accumulated experience and knowledge 
during its existence.
Table 1. Crude steel’s production in major countries
(in thousand tons)
Year USA Japan UK Germany
1875 369 1 719 371
1900 10,352 1 4,980 6,646
1940 60,766 6,856 13,184 19,141
1946 60,421 557 12,899 2,551
1950 87,848 4,839 16,554 12,121
1955 106,173 9,408 20,008 21,335
1960 90,067 22,138 24,995 34,100
1965 119,260 41,161 27,439 36,821
1969 127,976 82,166 26,855 45,316
Source: Ministry of Trade and Industry, Yearbook of Iron and Steel Statistics
 However, to answer the question if the iron and steel 
industry was in infancy stage we have to analyze its competitiveness 
immediately after the War. At that time, production in Japanese iron 
and steel industry was almost nonexistent and because it has  to  start 
its  production  from  zero  it  is  considered  as  an  infant  industry. 
Furthermore, the costs of production were too high that it would not 
survive under the free trade. In the Table 1 it is shown that volume of 
the production was at a very law level comparing to its international 
rivals.
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III. CRITERIA FOR PROTECTIONISM
 Neoclassical theory holds that the protection of an infant 
industry can be justified only under somewhat stringent conditions 
(Kemp 1960). There are four tests which should be satisfied if the 
industry deserves to be protected. As I am analysing the development 
of the iron and steel industry that occurred in the period from 1950 to 
1970, I can make analysis if and when those tests were satisfied.
Mill’s Test – For the protection to be really temporary it is necessary 
that the industry in question should in fact eventually become self-
sustaining. This requires the productivity to increase over the time 
such that the industry can eventually be able to compete under the 
free trade.
Table 2. Labor Productivity in Major Producers Country
(Yearly crude steel production in tones divided by number of workers)
Year USA Japan UK Germany
1959 - 78.9 83.1 90.4
1962 187.6 105.8 89.8 96.2
1965 221.5 159.6 113.1 118.4
1969 247.6 301.1 125.6 156.3
Source: Ministry for Trade and Industry, Yearbook of Iron and Steel Statistics
 In Table 2 it is shown that Japanese iron and steel industry 
took the first position in the world regarding the labor productivity. 
Corden (1974) states that the Mill’s test is satisfied when the average 
costs are equal the import price. Most textbooks of the international 
trade and economic development indicate this to be the timing for the 
protection removal. As the data on import prices are non-existent, I 
will base my discussion on the comparison of the average costs and 
the world prices. This comparison is presented in Table 3. In 1956 the 
world price of finished steel and
 
 Japanese average costs are almost equal and this is the year 
when Mill’s test is satisfied. It can be seen that Japanese iron and steel 
companies reached cost competitiveness in 1958.
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Table 3. World Price, Average Cost of Production and
Domestic Price of Finished Steel in Japan and USA (in $US)
Year World 
Price
Average 
Production 
Costs Japan
Average 
Production 
Costs USA
Domestic 
Price 
Japan
Domestic 
Price USA
1956 130.0 131.7 100.6 175 119
1958 126.2 89.5 110.8 148 127
1960 134.0 77.2 109.0 125 147
1965 141.6 69.3 102.5 123 161
1968 153.4 61.5 108.3 116 199
Source: Japanese Association of Iron and Steel, World of Iron and Steel
 Bastable Test – social benefits from the industry when it is 
mature should more than compensate for the social costs incurred in 
protecting the industry in its infancy. This means that price should 
decrease over the time. The period when the protection should be 
removed is the time when the average costs are less than the imported 
price or world average price. From the data in Table 3 it can be said 
that Bastable test was satisfied in 1958.
 Kemp Test – is based on the presence of the uncertainty 
and the imperfection of the capital market. The capital market’s 
imperfection was solved through the establishment of the Japan 
Development Bank, which supported the iron and steel industry with 
the low interest loans. Uncertainty is connected to the technological 
improvements. If firms within an industry can collect the benefits of 
the learning process, there is no need to protect them socially, since 
they can make up for their initial private losses by their future private 
profits. However, if the outcome of the learning process cannot be 
accumulated this constitutes legitimate reasons for protecting infant 
industries. Until 1958, private agents adopted various types of the 
new technologies of which main are the blast oxygen furnace and 
continuous casting process technologies. This justifies protection in 
Japanese iron and steel industry.
 Neigishi Test – there is a clear case for protecting the infant 
industry if the country is ‘large enough’ in jargon of international 
trade theory. Suppose that the expansion of output by a present day 
infant industry reduces the international relative price of its  product 
in  the future.  Decrease of  international  price  in  future will increase 
consumer  surplus  and  this  is  the  case  where  protecting  today’s 
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infant industry may yield higher overall level of world’s economic 
welfare. The Table3 shows that the Japanese iron and steel prices had 
an influence on the world price since 1960s. As it can be seen that all 
tests were satisfied until 1960, this is the year when protection could be 
removed.
 It is difficult for an industry to become established without 
temporary protection  by  the  government.  In  general,  which  industry 
should  be  promoted depends not only on the industry itself but also 
on the industrial structure of the country, as well as on the structure 
of demand in the world as a whole. Policies to protect and promote an 
infant industry can be justified for the developing country, but it has 
to be evaluated how those policies have affected countries economic 
welfare.
IV. PARTIAL EQUILIBRIUM APPROACH
 Protective measures may be estimated in the general or partial 
equilibrium. For my estimation, I will concentrate on the partial 
equilibrium model. If the good is homogenous, has the same price 
in the import and domestic markets, all changes could be present in 
one figure and application of the Corden-Johnson model1 would be 
possible. This model is applicable only in analysis where the domestic 
price is enlarged just for the tariff. However, application of Corden–
Johnson methodology to evaluate protection in Japan would be 
inappropriate because the Japanese market was not only protected by 
formal tariffs but by the import quotas and other measures as well. 
That is why I have to separate domestic and import markets and apply 
a model that was designed by Hofbauer and Elliott (1994).
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 The framework is founded on the partial equilibrium analysis 
with three key assumptions: (a) the domestic good and the imported 
good are perfect substitutes, (b) the supply schedule for the imported 
good is flat (perfectly elastic) which shows that country is small, and 
as the iron and steel was an infant industry, it was small comparing 
to other foreign rivals, and (c) the supply schedule for the domestic 
good is upwardly sloped (less than perfectly elastic).
 The effects of the barriers (either a tariff or a quota) under 
these assumptions are illustrated in Figure 1. and Figure 2. Trade 
policy raises the import price of steel by tariff (Pm–Pw) or lowers 
import by (Qw–Qm) in the case of the quantity restrains. The increase 
of the import price shifts the domestic demand curve from Dd  to Dd’. 
The increase in import price leads domestic suppliers to raise price by 
the Pd, which in turns raises the import demand schedule to Dm. The 
post restriction equilibrium is given by Pm, Qm, Pd’ and Qd’.
V. METHODOLOGY OF CALCULATING THE WELFARE 
EFFECTS
 In a short-run, the changes in prices and quantities due 
to trade protection results in a loss of consumer surplus, both in 
import market and in the domestic market. However, in a case of the 
protection which is imposed in order to develop an industry, today’s 
protection might results in gain of consumer surplus in the future. 
The trade restrictions will provide producer’s gain and consumer’s 
surplus. If the trade restrain take a form of tariff, than the government 
tariff revenue will arise. If non-tariff barriers such as an import quota 
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are imposed, the rent to the domestic importers1  will be created. 
Finally, there would be an efficiency loss because the trade restrain 
effected the allocation of the resources.
 The methodology used here to quantify these welfare effects in 
based on assumption that goods are perfect substitute. The consumer’s 
surplus loss from trade barriers in the import market is approximated 
by the area bounded by points aceg in Figure 1. This method of 
estimating the consumer loss in the imported market gives an average 
of the consumer loss calculated separately from the two demand curves. 
Jones (1993) gave a mathematical proof of the validity of this method. 
Using the new demand schedule (Dm) gives the area marked acdg as 
the change in the consumer surplus, while the old demand schedule 
(Dw) gives the area marked abeg. The difference between the two areas 
is shown by the parallelogram marked bcde. Line ce divides the area 
in half and gives the compromise consumer surplus change, area aceg. 
Area aceg can be estimated by adding rectangle acfg to triangle cef.
 If the form of protection is tariff, the rectangular area acfg 
represent the government tariff revenues, and may be estimated as: 
(Pm – Pw) × Qm. The area of the triangle marked cef represent loss, 
which may be estimated as: 1/2  × [ (Pm – Pm’) × (Qm’ – Qm)].
 
The effects in the market for the domestically produced good (Figure 
2) are as follows:   the   consumer   welfare   loss   from   higher   domestic 
prices   may   be approximated by the area marker svyz. Area swyz 
can be estimated by subtracting rectangle svxz and triangle vxy. This 
amounts to: (Pd’ – Pd) × Qd’ –  1/2  × [(Pd’ – Pd) × (Qd’ – Qd)].
In the domestic market, the consumer loss is just offset by the producer’s
surplus gain.
VI. THE WELFARE EFFECTS IN THE JAPANESE IRON AND 
STEEL INDUSTRY
 Because Japanese iron and steel industry become the world’s 
biggest steel exporter, we may conclude that protection at the early 
period was justified. Krugman (1991) has explained how the protection 
can work as force for export promotion. Anyhow, in order to check 
difference between the loss and gain in the domestic market, it is 
needed to compare how much the domestic consumers actually have 
1 In Japan domestic importers generally capture the quota rents that arise from non-tariff barriers 
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paid for finished steel products in the protected domestic market, as 
well as how much they would pay if there were no protection. In that 
sense, I will compare real expenditures consumer paid at the domestic 
market with the “hypothetical” expenditures they would pay in the 
absence of the trade barriers. During the period from 1950 to 1970, 
the domestic consumers paid US$ 47,041,986,000on domestic market 
and US$ 372,929,360 on import market. Domestic consumers’ total 
expenditures for the finished steel products are US$ 47,141,915,360.
 Assume that domestic consumers were consuming the same 
quantity (Qc = Qd+Qm)  and  paying  world’s  prices  (Qc×Pw) 
total  expenditures  would  be US$53,394,843,800. In this calculation 
I used average world price that include the price of the Japanese 
producers which in the late 1950s become the cheapest price in the 
world’s market. The difference between the real expenditure and 
expenditures that would occur in the absence of the trade barriers is 
US$ 6,252,928,440. This means that the domestic consumers at the 
beginning of protection process were facing a loss but in the future 
they gained from the development of the infant industry. In the 
period of twenty years, Japanese consumers benefited more than US$ 
6 billion. If we assume that the iron and steel industry in Japan was not 
established and exclude the Japanese domestic price in the process of 
calculating the average world price, the consumer gain would be even 
more. For their consumption they would pay US$ 55,033,840,000, 
and the difference between the real expenditure and the calculated 
one would be US$ 7,891,924,640.
 The consumer surplus gain at the domestic market in the 
twenty years is US$ 5,988,004,800 (difference between gain and 
loss). In first ten years, the domestic consumers suffered a loss, but 
in the last ten years their gain was four times larger. On the import 
market, if we ignore the efficacy loss, the consumer loss is equal to the 
government tariff revenue which is equal to almost US$ 49 million.
 To find the efficacy losses in the import and domestic markets 
it is common practice to compare the volume of imported goods 
before or after the restriction. In the case of the postwar iron and 
steel industry in Japan it is no use comparing the data with prewar 
period, as much as, comparing it with period after 1970 when the 
industry was already in the mature phase. In the absence of the data of 
elasticities or the data of the produced and imported volume changes 
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that would happened in the absence of the trade barriers we cannot 
find the real efficacy losses.
VII. CONCLUSION
 It is difficult for an industry to become established without 
temporary protection by the government. Theoretically, the protection 
of the infant industry can be justified if there is possibility for static or 
dynamic externalities to occur. There are four tests to be considered 
when protecting an industry. In a case of Japanese iron and steel 
industry all four test for protection were satisfied.
 Policies to protect and promote an infant industry can be 
justified for the developing country, but it has to be evaluated how 
those policies have affected countries economic welfare. In the case of 
the Japanese iron and steel industry, the improvement in production 
process was achieved so that prices of the product were declining 
compared to other foreign rivals. Thus, in the long run not just 
domestic but foreign users of these products gained. The iron and steel 
domestic consumer had suffered the loss for the first ten years, but in 
the next ten years they gained more than four times. This is the reason 
why the iron and steel industry deserved to be protected in the process 
of the development of Japan.
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